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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of candidate selection on intra-party incumbency 
turnover. In the intra-party context, we expect to see competition among candidates 
for selectors’ support. However, competition levels may vary over different types of 
candidate selection processes. Based on the US case, some authors argue that 
highly inclusive selectorates produce less competition and are more advantageous 
to incumbents (Ansolabehere et al. 2007; Herrnson, 1997). Recent research on list 
PR systems contradicts this claim (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). This article 
contributes to this research with a detailed account of this relation in flexible-list 
systems. We distinguish between four types of candidate selection outcomes for 
incumbents: realistic, marginal, or unrealistic list positions, and de-selection. The 
analysis is based on the case of the Belgian Lower House (1987-2010). The results 
show that incumbents rarely get de-selected in selection methods with member 
influence, which is in line with findings in majoritarian systems. 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 73rd Annual Conference of the Midwest Political 
Science Association, April 16-19 2015, Chicago. 





This paper examines the effect of candidate selection methods on intra-party incumbency 
turnover. The latter concept refers to de-selection of incumbents, and is related to the level of 
competition in intra-party candidate selection. Party selectorates might prefer to trade some of 
their incumbent MPs for promising non-incumbent challengers to ensure the influx of new 
ideas. But in which cases is intra-party competition highest? Which candidate selection 
methods activate party selectorates to de-select incumbents? 
Intra-party de-selection of incumbents has important consequences for the overall level of 
turnover in the legislative arena. Determinants of legislative turnover are still contentious 
issues in political science. Scholars have extensively discussed both the advantages and 
disadvantages of high turnover rates (Putnam, 1976; Somit et al., 1994), and empirical 
research covers both US and European cases (Heinsohn and Freitag, 2012; Manow, 2007; 
Matland and Studlar, 2004).  
These studies contributed to the knowledge on turnover determinants, but seem to ignore the 
effects of intra-party candidate selection. Matland and Studlar (2004: 95-96) shortly discuss 
intra-party defeat as a source for legislative turnover, but amalgamate the effects of ballot 
type, which is related to the electoral system, and ballot access, which is related to intra-party 
candidate selection (Shomer, 2009). Candidate selection processes are, however, separate 
institutions that deserve to be examined in isolation of the electoral system at hand.  
With regard to intra-party candidate selection processes, we would always expect to see 
competition between aspirant-candidates for the support of selectors (Hazan and Rahat, 
2010). However, competition levels may vary over different types of candidate selection 
methods. Some authors argue that inclusive selection methods such as primaries tend to 
produce low competition and are more advantageous to incumbents (Ansolabehere et al., 
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2007; Kenig, 2009). Furthermore, decentralized candidate selection also breeds low 
competition, as appears from evidence on the cases of Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
US (Carty et al., 2000; Herrnson, 1997; Ohman, 2004).   
But previous research on intra-party competition suffers from a number of shortcomings. 
Most studies have only examined the effect of intra-party competition on turnover in the 
extremely inclusive US context. In continental Europe with its typical list proportional 
electoral systems, primary elections or other highly inclusive selection methods are less 
common (Indridason and Sigurjónsdóttir, 2014). In addition, the concept of incumbent de-
selection is not as straightforward in list PR systems as in majoritarian systems. In first-past-
the-post systems, for example, incumbents can either be re-nominated or de-selected by the 
party selectorate. In multimember districts, party ballots often contain higher numbers of list 
slots with varying degrees of re-election chances, which implies more selection outcomes for 
incumbents than the simple dichotomous re-nomination/de-selection.  
This paper aims to fill this lacuna and analyzes the effects of intra-party candidate selection 
methods on incumbency turnover in the flexible list system of Belgium (1987-2010).  On the 
basis of data on legislative composition and candidate lists, we examine which incumbents of 
the Belgian Lower House are re-selected in realistic list positions, relegated to marginal or 
unrealistic list positions, or finally de-selected. De-selection or list relegation of incumbents is 
believed to be very rare in Belgian political parties (De Winter, 1988). However, no attempts 
have been made to test this claim based on the analysis of candidate lists for Belgian 
elections.  
 
Intra-party incumbency turnover in list proportional systems 
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At the end of every legislative term, incumbents seeking re-election turn towards their parties’ 
selectorate for ballot access. The party selectorate, defined as the intra-party body that selects 
candidates, estimates the costs and benefits of re-selecting incumbents. Some of the obvious 
benefits are their electoral appeal and legislative experience. The incumbency advantage in 
elections is the most important reason for parties to re-nominate incumbents (Somit et al., 
1994). 
However, party selectorates can also have reasons to de-select incumbents. Candidate 
selection is the mechanism through which parties punish MPs who displayed dissident 
behavior or caused damage to the party image. Some parties might even commit themselves 
to automatically de-select a portion of their incumbent MPs and replace them by non-
incumbent challengers. Reasons for incumbent de-selections are the input of new candidate 
profiles to the party list, or fresh ideas to the party in public office. At least some level of 
intra-party competition would also lead to higher party responsiveness by MPs.  
Detecting intra-party incumbency turnover in single-member district systems is 
straightforward: all incumbents who are being replaced by intra-party challengers in their 
electoral districts are cases of incumbent de-selection. Identifying these cases is more difficult 
in proportional representation systems with multimember districts. Party lists with large 
numbers of candidate slots provide party selectorates with a variety of options for dealing 
with incumbents.  Incumbent MPs may get de-selected, which is easily identifiable through 
absence on the party list in subsequent elections. If the party selectorate instead chooses to re-
select incumbents, there are still multiple outcomes.  
A first outcome is that incumbents are assigned to list positions with realistic chances of 
getting elected. Whether or not a list position can be considered as realistic depends on the 
electoral system and party strength in the district (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Realistic positions 
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in PR systems bear some resemblance to the concept of safe seats in majoritarian systems. In 
both cases, ‘an electable position is one that the party traditionally wins’ (Taylor, 1996: 336). 
In closed-list PR systems, it suffices to assess how many seats the party is expected to win in 
the district. If a party can realistically hope for four seats, then the first four positions on the 
list can be considered realistic.  In semi-open list PR systems, the exercise gets more 
complicated as the list rank order is no longer the only criterion by which seat allocation is 
determined. However, it remains difficult in these ‘closed-list systems in disguise’ to 
overcome the list rank order by means of preference votes (Crisp et al., 2013: 658). 
Secondly, incumbents in marginal positions still have a chance of obtaining a seat in 
parliament, but the outcome strongly depends on both the party’s and the incumbent’s 
election result. These positions are located right after the realistic ones. If the party realizes a 
significant upward swing, this might result in additional seats and consequently these list 
positions might yield a legislative seat. Thirdly, there is a group of anonymous, lower 
positions on the candidate list with virtually no chances of getting elected. Because these list 
slots do not give any seat prospects, they can be considered unrealistic list positions. 
In sum, we distinguish three types of candidate list positions in list PR systems. As a result, 
incumbency turnover can take on different forms in these electoral systems: party selectorates 
can not only de-select its incumbents, but relegate them to less attractive list positions. While 
this typology might have its applications for analyzing party lists in flexible or closed-list PR 
systems, it also has its limitations since the delineation of realistic and marginal positions 
strongly varies over different cases of the same electoral system. In Belgium, for instance, the 
last position on the list is often considered important by party selectorates and voters (Wauters 
et al., 2004). As a result, the operationalization of realistic, marginal and unrealistic positions 
should always be considered a case-specific endeavor. This makes the construction of a 




Candidate selection and incumbency turnover: theory and hypotheses 
Candidate selection is the core activity that distinguishes political parties from any other type 
of political organization  (Sartori, 1976). The evolution of selection methods has been 
extensively studied (e.g.  Bille, 2001; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). The most cited analytical 
framework for comparative analysis has been developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001). Their 
model disentangles four dimensions of candidate selection, among which centralization and 
inclusiveness of the selectorate are the most important ones.  
Inclusiveness of the selectorate 
The selectorate, on the one hand, is the body that selects the candidates, and can be composed 
of only one person, or several people, up to the entire electorate of the nation. This dimension 
can be measured on a continuum from exclusive selectorates, where a very limited group of 
selectors take control, to inclusive selectorates, such as party members or the electorate.  
There is, however, no consensus on the relation between the inclusiveness dimension and 
intra-party competition. A first group of authors finds that highly inclusive selection methods 
such as primaries lead to lower competition (Kenig, 2009; Obler, 1974). They argue that 
incumbents have more re-selection chances in primaries than in more exclusive selection 
methods due to the nature of competition. Primaries are more publicly organized and attract 
more mass media attention (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). As a result, building personal 
reputations becomes important, which benefits incumbents vis-a-vis non-incumbent 
challengers. In addition, the aspect of personal communication and network with selectors 
reinforces this competitive advantage. Large selectorates (e.g. party members) are difficult to 
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build a personal connection with, which makes it difficult for challengers to convince 
selectors to support their nomination bid.  
The effects of primary elections have been extensively studied in the US context (e.g. Banks 
and Kiewiet, 1989; Gerber and Morton, 1998). This is not surprising, since primary elections 
have been used for selection procedures in almost all US state and federal offices over the last 
century. With regard to competitiveness, US research has shown that, as is the case in general 
elections, a large incumbency advantage exists in primary elections (Ansolabehere et al., 
2007). This advantage has grown over the course of the twentieth century and helps to explain 
the declining competition in primary elections. However, there is a lack of knowledge on the 
consequences of these inclusive selection methods outside the US context (Carey and Polga-
Hecimovich, 2006). 
And indeed, a second group of authors studying proportional electoral systems are not 
convinced that primaries lead to low competition levels. Kristjànsson (1998) argues that 
inclusiveness instead increases intra-party competition, making incumbents far less secure in 
their seats. Indridason and Kristinsson (2013) find no support for either a decline or increase 
of intra-party competition in primaries. Others argue that highly inclusive selection methods 
lead to more moderate levels of competition (Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Rahat et al., 2008).  
In addition, this second group has argued that competition in exclusive selection methods is 
lower than in the case of primaries (Rahat, 2009). This is explained by the lack of ‘popular 
democratic legitimacy’ of these exclusive selectorates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 135): small 
nominating committees invoke the image of smoke-filled rooms where the inner party circle 
takes all the decisions without any regard for the will of the larger party organization. This 
may lead to increased intra-party factionalism and decreased trust by party members and 
supporters. To counter this perception, small nominating committees need to legitimize their 
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decisions by drafting candidate lists that will get wide support within party ranks (Matthews 
and Valen, 1999). As a result, candidate lists will mainly be composed of incumbents, since 
this will not endanger internal status quo and also serves the common good of the party in 
electoral terms. Rahat et al. (2008) found empirical evidence for this argument based on 
candidate lists from Israeli parties. 
In sum, the literature suggests that, in proportional electoral systems, primaries lead to 
medium levels of competition and small nominating committees to low competition. Are 
there any candidate selection methods available that result into high intra-party competition? 
According to the same authors, competition will be highest in a third category of 
inclusiveness where candidate selection is dominated by party delegates (Rahat and Hazan, 
2005). With delegates, non-incumbent challengers have a higher chance of being recognized 
than in primaries, and they can still build a network with many of their selectors (Hazan and 
Rahat, 2010). Moreover, delegates are often appointed by members or other lower party 
echelons, which releases this type of selectorate from the legitimacy problems encountered by 
highly exclusive nomination committees. 
We formulate three hypotheses on the effects of inclusiveness of the selectorate on intra-party 
competition in the candidate selection process: 
H1. Highly exclusive candidate selection methods with small nominating committees 
have the lowest levels of incumbency turnover. 
H2. Candidate selection methods with party delegates have the highest levels of 
incumbency turnover. 
H3. Highly inclusive candidate selection methods with member involvement have 




The level of centralization 
Centralization measures the influence of local party branches in candidate selection processes. 
In highly centralized methods, the national party level has complete control over candidate 
nomination. In decentralized candidate selection methods, however, the role of the national 
level is limited and local branches organize their nomination processes autonomously. 
With regard to the effects of centralization on intra-party competition, the literature states that 
decentralization breeds low levels of competition (Carty et al., 2000; Herrnson, 1997; Ohman, 
2004). Territorially decentralized processes are being fought out in geographically smaller 
areas which reduces the number of competitors incumbents have to face. In addition, while 
incumbents might have the aura of being indispensable in their own district party 
organizations, national party organizations look at their MPs from a wider distance. National 
party selectorates are therefore less reluctant to de-select or relegate incumbents who are 
dominant within their own electoral districts. 
While there is no consensus on the relation between district magnitude and the level of 
centralization (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014), the selectorate at the district level is usually the 
dominant one in the candidate selection process (Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Hix, 2004). This 
implies that the incumbency advantage is stronger in highly decentralized electoral systems 
with small districts. However, as there are various real-world examples of candidate selection 
methods where both the national and district level are involved, we still need to examine the 
effects of district magnitude and centralization separately. 





The Belgian electoral system and political parties 
The Belgian electoral system has recently experienced a number of electoral reforms, but can 
still be characterized as a flexible-list system. Belgian voters have the choice to either cast one 
or multiple preference votes for party candidates on the same list, or to endorse the rank order 
established by the selectorate through a list vote (Shugart, 2005). Inter-party seat allocation is 
determined by the number of ballots with preference or list votes the party list has received. In 
theory, intra-party seat allocation is determined by both list order and the number of 
preference votes, but the threshold of preference votes to overcome the list order is reached 
very infrequently. This led some scholars to characterize flexible-list systems as closed-list 
systems in disguise (Crisp et al., 2013). 
While the importance of rank order has diminished over time (Wauters and Weekers, 2008),  
list positions are still very important in the (re-)election prospects of Belgian election 
candidates.  If candidates receive a specified number of preference votes, they automatically 
get elected. Otherwise, party list votes are assigned to the highest ranked candidates until they 
reach the specified amount of votes needed for election. In 2002, an electoral reform 
diminished the weight of list votes in order to increase the impact of preference votes on intra-
party seat allocation, but since then the number of candidates who have beaten the rank order 
is still limited (Fiers and Van Hecke, 2013). The ongoing importance of rank order makes the 
intra-party candidate selection process all the more important in determining who will get 
elected.  
We collected data on Belgian candidate selection methods on the basis of party regulations 
and internal documents, the analysis of press articles and existing literature. From 1987 until 
2010, there has been considerable variation in both the inclusiveness of the selectorate and 
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centralization levels of Belgian parties, possibly explained by the peculiar reality of separate 
regional party systems for Flemish and francophone parties. In any case, the importance of 
candidate selection and the variation in applied selection methods makes the Belgian case all 
the more interesting for examining the relation between candidate selection methods and 
incumbency turnover. 
Various Belgian parties allow their party members to participate in the candidate selection 
process, usually through the use of member polls. This system implies that members have the 
possibility to either ratify or reject model lists drafted by more exclusive nominating 
committees (De Winter, 1988). While this system was quite popular in both the Flemish and 
francophone Christian democratic party, the green parties and Flemish liberals have 
experimented with inclusive primary elections in the 1990s (Verleden, 2013). 
There are also examples of selection methods involving party delegates. The Flemish 
socialists, for example, have been applying a procedure where candidate lists are to be ratified 
by an assembly of member delegates. But also the Flemish Christian democrats have used 
these assemblies for the first three elections (1987, 1991, 1995) included in the analysis 
(Deschouwer, 1993). Finally, some parties have appointed small and exclusive party 
committees as party selectorates. The selectorate of the Walloon liberals, for example, was 
composed of the presidents of the various party components during the largest part of the 
period under investigation. They were entitled to appoint the top candidates on party lists, and 
in a final step of the selection process to approve the final candidate lists (Vandeleene et al., 
2013). 
In terms of centralization, there are several examples where both the district and the national 
party level are involved in the selection process. A typical example are the Flemish Christian 
democrats, where during the seven studied elections the district level initiates the selection 
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process by drafting a first list proposal, and the national level can either modify or ratify this 
list before it gets presented to the party members. The highest level of centralization we 
encountered in the Belgian case was where the national party level had veto right in the final 
phase of the selection process. Since 1995, the Flemish socialists have been applying this type 
of selection method. The Flemish liberals, on the other hand, have a strong tradition of 
decentralized methods where the role of the national party level is very limited. Even during 
the early elections of 1987 and 2010, no national veto power was detected. 
Party groups in the Belgian Lower House are characterized by high levels of legislative voting 
unity (Depauw, 2002).  In theory, one expects that dissident legislative behavior by MPs has 
an impact on their de-selection prospects: party elites may sanction incumbents who refused 
to follow the party line during the previous legislative term. However, in the Belgian case this 
predictor should be considered less relevant in empirical analysis since legislative discipline 
has been very strict among the party groups in the Lower House. In fact, Depauw (2002: 230) 
found that even the most dissident incumbent MPs were not sanctioned with lower list 
positions. As a result, we leave out legislative discipline as predictor in the analysis and focus 
instead on the procedural aspects of intra-party candidate selection.  
 
Data 
Data on the candidate selection outcomes of incumbents were drawn from the KANDI-
dataset, which contains both political as socio-economic information on party candidates for 
Belgian Lower House elections since 1987. With regard to the dependent variable, which 
measures the outcome of candidate selection for incumbents, there are four categories: (1) 
Realistic list positions, which are located at the top of the list and yield a substantially higher 
chance of getting elected than lower ranked candidates; (2) Marginal list positions, located 
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right after the realistic positions and the very end of the list; (3) Unrealistic list positions; (4) 
De-selection. 
This categorization is based on the assumption that Belgian parties themselves distinguish 
between different types of list positions, using previous district results as benchmarks 
(Maddens et al., 2014; Put and Maddens, 2013). For example, if a party won four seats in the 
district in the previous election, the first four positions could be considered realistic. The 
number of seats won in the previous election thus directly determines the number of realistic 
positions on the list. The candidate in fifth position, however, could be considered marginal: 
he/she stands a chance of getting elected on the condition that his or her number of preference 
votes is sufficiently high, and/or the party realizes an upward swing in the district. 
Additionally, the Belgian case has known many examples of candidates at the bottom of the 
list managing to get elected instead of higher ranked candidates (Wauters et al., 2004). 
Belgian parties seem to have the tradition of assigning these highly visible final positions to 
electorally popular politicians. Both the fifth and final position will in this case be considered 
marginal positions.  
The remainder of list positions can be considered unrealistic, as the candidates assigned to 
these positions have a very unrealistic chance of getting elected. Of course, there is some level 
of competition taking place in these seats between aspirant-candidates who are interested in 
getting on the party list, but this usually does not involve incumbent MPs or other serious 
contenders. Finally, incumbents that did not get selected constitute the fourth category of the 
dependent variable, de-selection. 
On the basis of candidate lists for the Belgian Lower House elections (1987-2010), candidate 
selection outcomes for all the incumbents of eight Belgian parties1 were analyzed. The official 
documents of the Lower House were collected to delineate the group of incumbents from the 
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previous legislative term. Incumbency is broadly defined, as it also includes members of the 
federal government and substitute-candidates who entered the assembly during the legislative 
term because of in-between turnover.2 The main independent variables of interest are the level 
of inclusiveness of the selectorate, and the level of centralization. These two dimensions of 
intra-party candidate selection are measured on separate ordinal three-point scales.3  
 






The first and most exclusive category on the scale of inclusiveness (Figure 1) are the selection 
methods where non-selected nominating committees dominate the process, without any 
member influence. The middle category consists of procedures with party delegates appointed 
by members. Finally, the most inclusive category groups selection methods with member 
influence. 







1 2 3 
1: The selection process is dominated by one or more non-selected 
nomination committees 
2: Member delegates participate in the selection process 
3: Members participate in the selection process 
1 2 3 
1: The national party level dominates the final phase of the selection 
process and/or has veto power 
2: The selection process is an interaction/cooperation between the 
national and district level 
3: The selection process takes place at the district level, national level 
is not involved 
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The second scale measures the level of centralization in the candidate selection process 
(Figure 2). The highest level of centralization is reached when the national party dominates 
the final step in the selection process, for example, through last-minute modification of 
candidate lists or by practicing veto power. The other end of the continuum are highly 
decentralized methods where the district party autonomously drafts lists without national 
influence. The middle category groups selection methods where candidate lists are the 
product of interaction between the national and district level. 
District magnitude, age, sex, being an incumbent member of government and holding other 
parliamentary offices are the other independent variables that need to be taken into account. 
First, district magnitude is an important control variable as it also determines the nature of 
intra-party competition between candidates. The smaller the district, the closer the 
competition will resemble single-member districts. In larger districts, multiple incumbents 
compete for realistic positions which increases the odds of de-selection or relegation to lower 
list positions.  
Candidate selection outcomes might also be related to personal characteristics of incumbents. 
Previous research found evidence for gender effects in de-selection decisions 
(Vanlangenakker et al., 2013). Women are more likely to be de-selected by the party than 
men, since party selectors are often suspected to be less favorably disposed toward women’s 
candidacies (Bochel and Denver, 1983). Furthermore, the age of incumbents is also expected 
to play an important role in intra-party competition. Older incumbents will most definitely be 
more inclined to voluntarily retire, which should result in a strong age effect for the fourth 
category of the response variable. As the group of incumbents includes members of 
government, the analysis will also control for the effect of this group on turnover chances. 
Members of government are often leading politicians within their parties, and received 
considerable media attention during the preceding legislative term. Therefore, we expect this 
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group to have significantly lower odds of getting de-selected or assigned to 
marginal/unrealistic list positions. 
Finally, the analysis will also take into account whether incumbents either switched to other 
political offices during their term in the Lower House, or gained other parliamentary offices 
in a concurrently organized election.4 The availability of parliamentary offices is relatively 
high in the Belgian political opportunity structure. Incumbent Lower House MPs may choose 
to move to another assembly, or their party may consider moving them instead of running for 
Lower House again. These incumbents are often referred to as level-hoppers who already 
moved to another level but still decided to run for election for their previous parliament to 
support the party list (Fiers, 2001). Party selectorates might decide to assign marginal or even 
unrealistic places to these incumbents. And if they get elected, these candidates will not 
always take up their seat. Level-hoppers could therefore inflate the number of relegated or de-
selected incumbents in our dataset. As a result, the analysis will include a binary predictor 
identifying incumbents that switched to other parliamentary offices during the legislative 
term. In this way, we are able to account for these unreal forms of de-selection. 
 
Analysis 
Our data on candidate selection outcomes for Lower House incumbents (1987-2010) indicate 
that there is a strong overrepresentation in the category of realistic positions on party lists. 
Table 1 shows that 59.6% of incumbents in our data sample (N=1237) end up in these highly 
attractive list positions, where re-election chances are extremely high. This demonstrates that 
party selectorates are highly inclined to reserve these list positions to MPs with at least some 
previous experience in the Lower House. Only 4.8% of the incumbents were assigned to 
marginal list positions, and incumbents in unrealistic positions on the list only made up 6% of 
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the sample. De-selection, which constitutes the fourth response category, is the second largest 
group with 29.6%. However, we already mentioned that these de-selected incumbents are not 
only victims of intra-party competition, but sometimes hop to another parliament or 
voluntarily retire from politics. 
Table 1: Candidate selection outcomes for Belgian Lower House incumbents (1987-2010) 
 # % 
Realistic positions 737 59.60 
Marginal positions 60 4.84 
Unrealistic positions 74 5.97 
De-selection 366 29.59 
N 1237 100 
 
But how are these selection outcomes linked to the nature of candidate selection methods? 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of incumbents over the three categories of selectorate and 
centralization. With regard to inclusiveness of the selectorate, 43% of these incumbents were 
selected through procedures involving party members, such as primaries or member polls. 
This is the outcome of the democratization in candidate selection within various Belgian 
parties during the 1990s. While systems with party delegates were also relatively popular 
between 1987 and 2010, the exclusive nomination committees only controlled the selection 









In terms of centralization, the majority of Belgian candidate selection methods were to some 
extent controlled by the national party level: 39% of incumbents were selected by exclusively 
national selectorates, and another 34% were a combination of district and national party level 
selectorates. Roughly a fourth of Lower House incumbents were selected without any form of 
national party intervention.  
While Figure 3 shows considerable variation in candidate selection methods, the question is 
how these dimensions determine the level of intra-party competition. Bivariate analysis shows 
that only the level of centralization is significantly associated with selection outcomes (χ=17.1 
; P<0.01). In highly centralized methods, a higher proportion of incumbents ends up in 
marginal and unrealistic list positions than in mixed and decentralized methods. This indicates 
that competition is considerably higher in centralized candidate selection methods. 
Other significant bivariate associations are found for gender (χ=29.2 ; P<0.001), holding other 
office (χ=160.3 ; P<0.001), being incumbent member of government (χ=10.7 ; P<0.05)  and 
age (Spearman’s ρ=0.3 ; P<0.001). First, while only 18.3% of incumbents in the data sample 
are women, 40.5% of incumbents in unrealistic positions are women. It seems that 
selectorates would rather shuffle their female incumbents to these lower positions than their 
male counterparts. This type of gender-effect was not found for other candidate selection 
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outcomes. Secondly, holding another office is also highly associated with the dependent 
variable. In marginal and unrealistic positions as well as the group of de-selected incumbents, 
there is an overrepresentation of incumbents who moved to other parliaments during the 
Lower House legislative term or concurrent with its re-election. Thirdly, incumbent members 
of government are generally more assigned to realistic list positions (69.4%) and significantly 
less de-selected by their party selectorates (19,7%). Finally, age has a significant positive 
correlation with selection outcomes, which shows that older incumbents are associated with 
lower list positions and de-selection. 
Table 2 displays the results of a multinomial logit model with realistic list positions as 
reference category. As there are three other response categories in the dependent variable, 
three coefficients are estimated for each of the predictors. Selectorate and centralization both 
have a significant effect on candidate selection outcomes for incumbents, but the findings are 
not always in line with the formulated hypotheses.  
As for inclusiveness of the selectorate, candidate selection methods involving party members 
lead to the lowest competition: the odds of getting de-selected decrease by 54% in these 
democratic selection procedures compared to the reference category of highly exclusive 
nomination committees. A comparable effect was found for marginal positions, but the 
estimate is only borderline significant (P<0.10). The middle category of inclusiveness, where 






Table 2: Multinomial logit model with candidate selection outcome for incumbents as 
dependent variable 
 Marginal position Unrealistic position De-selection 
Exp(B)  (SE) Exp(B)  (SE) Exp(B)  (SE) 
Selectorate (ref: exclusive committees)          
Party delegates 0.711 (0.36) 1.045  (0.33) 1.022 (0.18) 
Party members 0.504 (0.42) 0.682  (0.39) 0.462*** (0.23) 
Centralization (ref: District)        
National/district 0.653 (0.37) 0.760  (0.35) 0.727† (0.19) 
National 1.762 (0.39) 2.332 * (0.36) 1.424† (0.21) 
Gender (ref: male) 1.160 (0.37) 3.505 *** (0.28) 0.983  (0.21) 
Age (centred) 1.106 *** (0.02) 1.065 *** (0.01) 1.097*** (0.01) 
District magnitude 1.069 *** (0.02) 1.011  (0.02) 1.004 (0.01) 
Holding other parliamentary office 8.372 *** (0.34) 4.947 *** (0.32) 11.042*** (0.20) 
Incumbent member of government 0.399 † (0.50) 0.974  (0.35) 0.383*** (0.25) 
Mc Fadden’s Pseudo R²   0.157     
Note: Odds ratios and standard errors (between brackets) are shown. Reference category of dependent variable is 
‘Realistic position’. Significance:  *** <0.001, ** <0.01, * <0.05, † <0.10 . 
 
The results for the centralization dimension are in line with previous findings by Hazan and 
Rahat (2010). Our data suggest that competition is substantially lower in decentralized 
selection methods. In highly centralized methods controlled by the national party level, the 
odds for incumbents to end up in unrealistic list positions more than double. Additionally, de-
selection is also 50% more common than in decentralized candidate selection methods. In 
sum, the data on Belgian incumbents confirm H4 about the relation between centralization 
and intra-party competition. The other hypotheses, however, are not supported by these 
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findings: competition is lowest in highly inclusive selection processes, which supports the 
argument made by scholars on US primaries and the incumbency advantage. 
With regard to the individual characteristics of incumbents, we find that both gender and age 
determine candidate selection outcomes. Female incumbents have significantly higher odds to 
be assigned to unrealistic positions. So the gender-effect which was previously suggested by 
the bivariate analysis has been confirmed by the multivariate model. However, the data do not 
support the idea that women are more exposed to de-selection or relegation to marginal 
positions.  
In addition, the estimates for age centered around its mean (49,7) are positive, indicating that 
the older the incumbent, the higher the odds that he/she will end up in lower list positions or 
de-selection. The effect is quite strong for de-selection: per one unit increase in age, the 
chances of getting de-selected increase by 9.7%. Older MPs will also be more inclined to 
retire from politics, which largely explains this age effect for de-selection. In sum, the 
predictors for individual characteristics show that the youngest and male incumbents are 
safest for intra-party competition and de-selection. 
Finally, the model also controls for the effects of district magnitude, being incumbent member 
of government and holding other parliamentary office. While district magnitude only 
determines the odds of falling into marginal positions, its effect is relatively strong: per extra 
seat in the district, the odds of incumbents getting assigned to these risky list positions 
increase by 6.7%. This result makes sense: in small electoral districts, the visibility of 
incumbents is higher, which strengthens the incumbency advantage in elections and 
selections. In large districts with larger numbers of incumbents, however, it becomes easier 
for party selectorates to shuffle one or more of these incumbents to lower positions on the list 
where they have to battle for re-election. Not all incumbents in large districts are equally well-
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known, which makes it easier to replace them with newcomers or alternative candidate 
profiles for reasons of ticket-balancing or turnover. However, party selectorates in large 
districts only move incumbents to marginal positions. If they would assign them to unrealistic 
positions, they risk that the incumbent would take the honorable way out and voluntarily 
retire, which in turn could lead to electoral penalty. 
With regard to members of government, we only found a significant effect on the odds of 
getting de-selected. Self-evidently, incumbent ministers rarely get de-selected in subsequent 
elections. Finally, the strong effects of holding other offices on all three categories is not 
surprising either. Incumbents who switch to another parliament have signaled their disinterest 
in re-election to their party selectorates. Some of them get de-selected, which might indicate 
that it is simply not allowed to simultaneously be candidate for Lower House and the other 
assembly, or these MPs are not willing to invest in campaigns for seats they will not take up 
after all. Other incumbents may already hold other offices, but are still willing to run for 
office when asked by the party selectorate: even if the incumbents will not take up their seat 
in the Lower House, their presence on party lists may be crucial in getting additional votes 
and winning seats for other candidates. 
 
Conclusion 
Candidate selection methods matter for intra-party competition and incumbency turnover. 
Both the inclusiveness of the selectorate as the level of centralization codetermine the 
incumbents’ rate of success in candidate selection processes. As a result, these intra-party 




Surprisingly, the data on the Belgian Lower House seem to support earlier research on the US 
case: highly inclusive candidate selection methods with member influence generate the lowest 
competition. And while research on other list proportional systems has contradicted this 
claim, Belgian incumbents are safest in inclusive selection methods. More specifically, 
incumbents have lower chances on getting de-selected or assigned to marginal list positions if 
members participate in candidate selection. In addition, no significant differences were found 
between methods with party delegates and exclusive nomination committees. 
Furthermore, the results for centralization are in line with previous research: incumbents are 
safer in decentralized candidate selection methods. Territorial intra-party decentralization 
breeds low competition in Belgian parties. In nationalized candidate selection processes, 
incumbents are more often assigned to unrealistic list positions, or de-selected altogether. 
District party selectorates are less inclined to de-select incumbents than national party 
selectorates because of the dominant position incumbents take up in district organizations. 
The multivariate analysis also shows that district magnitude increases the odds of incumbents 
getting assigned to marginal list positions. Where the number of seats is high, the number of 
incumbents is also high and party selectorates will be more likely to de-select one of them to 
move newcomers forward. In small electoral districts (e.g. M=1 or 2), on the contrary, 
selectorates will be more careful as de-selection of incumbents will more likely lead to 
electoral penalty. Incumbents are more visible in smaller districts: voters feel that they are 
directly represented by their MP(s), leading to high levels of accountability and visibility. 
Arguably, de-selecting incumbents in small districts has larger electoral consequences than is 
the case in large districts. As district magnitude grows, voters will cease to identify with one 
sole MP and both accountability as visibility will decrease. 
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In sum, the negative relation between inclusiveness of the selectorate and incumbency 
turnover is the most substantial result of this contribution. It implies that intra-party 
democracy, in the form of opening up candidate selection processes to members, comes at the 
expense of intra-party competition. An increasing number of studies has already discussed the 
undesired effects of intra-party democratization: decreasing representativeness of parties 
toward their voters (Spies and Kaiser, 2014), unrepresentative candidate lists (Rahat et al., 
2008), and lower levels of intra-party cohesion, endangering governmental and parliamentary 
stability (Rahat, 2007). Even though intra-party democratization might contribute to 
confidence in parties among citizens and remedy party membership decline, it obviously has 
negative effects on other important democratic dimensions such as representation, 
responsiveness and competition (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). 
Not only inclusive but also decentralized selectorates can be perceived as  desirable from a 
normative democratic point of view. If candidate selection processes are strongly 
decentralized, citizens may feel more closely involved in intra-party decision making than in 
nationally organized candidate selections (Put et al., 2014). As selection takes place with a 
decentralized mechanism, voters feel their local interest are more preserved compared to the 
more remote selection processes at the national level. However,  our  analysis has shown that 
inclusive and decentralized candidate selection processes have a major drawback. They 
involve significantly lower levels of intra-party competition which will also lead to decreasing 
legislative turnover. As a consequence, there may be less room for fresh ideas in parliament  
and legislatures may suffer from legitimacy problems. Thus, while internal democracy may 
sound like a noble goal to political parties, it clearly has detrimental effects on representative 





                                                             
1 Selected parties are: (Open) VLD/PVV – Flemish liberals; PRL/MR – Walloon liberals; SP/SP.A – Flemish 
socialists; PS – Walloon socialists; CVP/CD&V – Flemish Christian democrats; PSC/CDH – Walloon Christian 
democrats; AGALEV – Flemish greens; ECOLO – Walloon greens. These parties were withheld on the basis of 
their permanent representation in parliament from 1987 until 2010.  
2 A particularity of the Belgian electoral system is that voters are presented with a list of effective as well as 
substitute candidates. These substitutes are also rank ordered on the basis of their preference votes, after the 
distribution of list votes. If an MP becomes member of government, resigns or dies, he or she will be replaced by 
the first substitute. As a result, we consider the first substitute candidate as a realistic position. 
3 The categories in these scales are largely based on the integrated six-point scale of candidate selection methods 
developed by Shomer (2009). 
4 Being a federal state, Belgium has a set of regional assemblies where incumbent Federal Lower House MPs 
could move to instead of running for re-election in their familiar assembly. Since 1995, elections have been held 
for Flemish, Walloon and Brussels parliaments. While the first two of these regional elections (1995, 1999) were 
concurrently organized (i.e. on the same day as the elections of the Lower House), the federal and regional 
elections became non-concurrent after 1999. Federal MPs were free to run for regional elections and to take up 
office if they got elected. Moreover, the Belgian parliamentary system is bicameral, implying that there are two 
legislative assemblies at the federal level. Next to the Lower House, Belgium also has a federal Senate with its 
own election (since 2014 indirectly elected) and competences. While the elections of both federal assemblies 
have always been concurrently organized, the Senate provides Belgian politicians with an additional opportunity 
to move towards another parliamentary office. 
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